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Abstract. We consider social networks of competing agents that evolve dynamically over
time. Such dynamic competition networks are directed, where a directed edge from nodes
u to v corresponds a negative social interaction. We present a novel hypothesis that serves
as a predictive tool to uncover alliances and leaders within dynamic competition networks.
Our focus is in the present study is to validate it on competitive networks arising from
social game shows such as Survivor and Big Brother.
1 Introduction
Complex social networks are heterogeneous, evolving, and pervasive in the natural
world and in technological settings. Social networks present rich sources of com-
plex networks, where nodes represent agents and edges correspond to some form
of social interaction. For example, in Facebook edges represent friendship, while
on Twitter they denote following. Complex, social networks commonly display
power law degree distributions, the small world property (short distances between
nodes and high local clustering) and other phenomena such as densification and
strong community structure; see [4,8,10]. Another key principle underlying social
networks is that links exhibit homophily, that is, nodes with similar social at-
tributes are linked, which is related to an embedding of the nodes in a so-called
Blau space, where nodes are assigned to points in a suitable metric space and the
relative distance between pairs of nodes is a function of similar social attributes.
See [5,17].
While social interaction is usually studied from the premise of friendship, co-
operation, or other positive social interactions, there is a growing literature on the
study of negative social interaction as a generative mechanism underlying social
networks. For example, while transitivity is a folkloric notion in social networks,
summarized in the adage that “friends of friends are more likely friends,” struc-
tural balance theory (see [14] and [10] for a modern treatment) points also to the
inverse adage “enemies of enemies are more likely friends.” A common problem in
this direction is the prediction of the type of edges in a social network [16,19,21].
Hence, competitive and negative relationships are critically important to the study
of social networks, and are often hidden drivers of link formation.
Competitive relationships were studied recently via the Iterated Local Anti-
Transitivity (or ILAT) model; see [6,7]. In the ILAT model, each node u duplicates
every time-step by forming its anti-clone u′, so that u′ joins to the nodes in the
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2non-neighbor set of u. We may also consider real-world networks of opposing
nation states, rival gangs or other organizations, and consider alliances formed
by mutually shared adversaries. The ILAT model provably generates highly dense
graphs with low diameter and high local clustering. See [13] for a recent study using
the spatial location of cities to form an interaction network, where links enable
the flow of cultural influence, and may be used to predict the rise of conflicts
and violence. Another example comes from market graphs, where the nodes are
stocks, and stocks are adjacent as a function of their correlation measured by a
threshold value θ ∈ (0, 1).Market graphs were considered in the case of negatively
correlated (or competitive) stocks, where stocks are adjacent if θ < α, for some
positive α; see [3].
In the present paper, we focus on the underlying structure of social networks
of competitors that evolve dynamically over time. We view such networks as di-
rected, where a directed edge from nodes u to v corresponds to some kind of
negative social interaction. For example, a directed edge may represent a vote by
one player for another in a social game such as the television program Survivor.
Directed edges are added over discrete time-steps in what we call dynamic com-
petitive networks. Our main contribution in this empirical work is a hypothesis
that serves as a predictive tool to uncover alliances and leaders within dynamic
competition networks. While the hypothesis may hold more broadly, our focus
here is on competitive networks arising from social game shows. We validate the
hypothesis using voting record data of the social game shows Survivor and Big
Brother.
We organize the discussion in this paper as follows. In Section 2, we formally
introduce dynamic competition networks, and using graph theoretic tools, give a
precise formulation of the Dynamic Competition Hypothesis. In Section 3 and the
Appendix (which will appear in the full version of the paper), we present voting
data from all the seasons of U.S. Survivor and Big Brother, focusing on three
seasons of Survivor in detail and one season of Big Brother. We analyze this data
using tools from network science in an effort to validate the Dynamic Competition
Hypothesis. We find that the hypothesis accurately predicts the emergence of
alliances and predicts finalists with a high degree of precision. The final section
interprets our results within the context of real-world complex networks, and
presents open problems derived from our analysis.
We consider directed graphs with multiple directed edges throughout the pa-
per. For background on graph theory, the reader is directed to [20]. Additional
background on complex networks may be found in the book [4].
2 Dynamic Competition Hypothesis
A competition network G is one where nodes represent agents, and there is directed
edge between nodes u and v in G if agent u is in competition with agent v.
The directed edge (u, v) may also represent a vote against v (depending on the
nature of G). A dynamic competition network is a competition network where
directed edges are added over discrete time-steps. For example, on the game show
3Survivor (as we discuss in detail in the next section), players cast votes against
each other, and the votes correspond to directed edges in the network. As another
example, nodes may consist of nation states and edges correspond to conflicts
between them. Dynamic competition networks may have multiple edges. Note that
dynamic competition networks are also models of (sports) tournaments. However,
in dynamic competition networks, not all nodes are joined by edges as is typically
the case in tournaments. Our focus in this work will be on dynamic competition
networks arising in social networks, and we focus specifically on networks arising
from Survivor and Big Brother.
Before we describe our hypothesis about the structure of competition networks,
we present some graph-theoretic terminology. We consider standard metrics in
network science, such as in- and out-degree, closeness and betweenness. Given the
nature of the voting network in Survivor, we also consider the number of common
out-neighbors as a key metric.
For nodes u, v, and w, we say that w is a common out-neighbor of u and v if
(u, w) and (v, w) are directed edges. For a pair of distinct nodes u, v, we define
CON(u, v) to be the number of common out-neighbors of u and v. For a fixed
node u, define
CON(u) =
∑
v∈V (G)
CON(u, v).
We call CON(u) the CON score of u. For a set of vertices S with at least two
nodes, we define
CON(S) =
∑
u,v∈S
CON(u, v).
Note that CON(S) is a non-negative integer.
A set of nodes S with no directed edges in its induced subgraph is called
independent ; we also need a notion of being “close” to independent. For a set S of
nodes, define its edge density to be the ratio ED(S) = |E(S)|/
(
|S|
2
)
. Observe that
ED(S) may be greater than 1 as there may be multiple edges in the digraphs we
consider. For a non-negative real number ǫ say that a set S is ǫ-near independent
if ED(S) ≤ ǫ. The parameter ǫ measures the relative density of sets of vertices.
We say that a set is near independent if it is ǫ-near independent for some positive
value of ǫ; typically, in applications, we take ǫ to be small. The value of ǫ will often
be heuristically determined in a real-world networks by considering a ranking
of subsets by their edge density. Note that independent sets are trivially near
independent.
For a strongly connected digraph G and a node v, define the closeness of u by
C(u) =

 ∑
v∈V (G)\{u}
d(u, v)


−1
where d(u, v) corresponds to the distance measured by one-way, directed paths
from u to v. The betweenness of v is defined by
B(v) =
∑
x,y∈V (G)\{v}
σxy(v)/σxy,
4where σxy(v) is the number of shortest one-way, directed paths between x and
y that go through v, and σxy is the number of shortest one-way, oriented paths
between x and y. Both closeness and betweenness are well-studied centrality mea-
sures for complex networks [9]. For example, centrality of sports networks is often
used to rank teams [15].
2.1 The hypothesis
Alliances are defined as groups of agents who pool capital towards mutual goals.
In the context of social game shows such as Survivor, alliances are groups of
players who work together to vote off players outside the alliance. Members of
an alliance are typically less likely to vote for each other, and this is the case
in strong alliances. Leaders are defined as members with high standing in the
network, and edges emanating from leaders may influence edge creation in other
agents. In Survivor, leaders may be the winner of a given season, but may also be
non-winning players with a strong influence on the outcomes of the game. One of
our main goals is to apply network science to help determine alliances and leaders
in dynamic competitive networks arising in social networks.
The Dynamic Competition Hypothesis (or DCH ) asserts that dynamic compe-
tition networks arising from a social networks satisfy the following four properties.
1. Alliances are near independent sets.
2. Strong alliances have low edge density.
3. Members of an alliance with high CON scores are more likely leaders.
4. Leaders exhibit high closeness, high CON scores, low in-degree, and high out-
degree.
The DCH provides a quantitative framework for the structure of dynamic
competition networks arising from social networks; no other data is required other
than the presence of competitive relationships. See Figure 1 for a visualization of
the DCH.
Note how items (1), (2), and (3) mutually reinforce each other. Once we have
discovered an alliance as per (1), we can measure its strength relative to other
alliances via (2), and use (3) as tool to isolate leaders within alliances. Item (4) is
independent of alliances; in particular, while we expect leaders to be in alliances
(that is, have prominent local influence), leaders are determined via global metrics
of the network.
Interestingly, closeness rather than betweenness appears be a good centrality
measure in the dynamic competition networks studied in the next section. This
may be explained by the low in-degree of nodes corresponding to leaders.
3 Data and Methods
We extracted data from the American television series Survivor over all of its
seasons, and for further validation, from all seasons of Big Brother. Before we
present the data in detail for a subset of seasons, we give some background on
5Fig. 1. A heat map representation of dynamic competition networks according to the DCH, where nodes
closer to the center have higher closeness and CON scores. Larger nodes have higher CON scores, lower
in-degree, and higher out-degree. The subsets correspond to alliances.
both series. Survivor and Big Brother are examples of social games, where social
interactions help determine the gameplay and winner. We focus on the US version
of both shows, but they play in several countries, accounting for over one hundred
seasons in total.
In Survivor, strangers called survivors are placed in a location and forced to
provide shelter and food for themselves, with limited support from the outside
world. Survivors are split into two or more tribes which cohabitate and work
together. Tribes compete for immunity and the losing tribe goes to tribal council
where one of their members is voted off. At some point during the season, tribes
merge and the remaining survivors compete for individual immunity. Survivors
voted off may be part of the jury. When there are a small number of remaining
survivors who are finalists (typically two or three), the jury votes in favor of one of
them to become the Sole Survivor who receives a cash prize of one million dollars.
In Big Brother, a group of strangers called HouseGuests cohabitate in a custom
set under video surveillance. Each week, the HouseGuests compete for the title
of Head of Household, who must nominate two HouseGuests for eviction. The
Houseguests vote to evict one of them, and the one with the most votes is evicted.
The winner received a cash prize of half a million dollars.
In both Survivor and Big Brother, several twists have been introduced during
the seasons. For example, in Survivor, these include the introduction of a hidden
immunity idol which would protect a survivor from being voted out if used during
tribal council. As a disclaimer, our analysis is insensitive to these twists.
Data was taken from Survivor Wiki [18] and Big Brother Wiki [2], which con-
tains information on contestants, their voting records and tribes, and catalogues
6of alliances. For computing centrality metrics and for the dynamic competition
graph visualization, we used the open source Gephi software [1].
We present below visualizations of the dynamic competition networks for Sur-
vivor: Borneo, China, Game Changes, and HHH; we also include data from Sea-
son 12 of Big Brother. Note that the data is taken after all votes had been cast
against other players, and tables are provided with a summary of relevant net-
work statistics. The order of the tables is given by their elimination order from
the game, so the first entry is the winner and the others are ordered by when
they were eliminated. In all of the five seasons described below, the data conforms
to the predictions of the DCH with regards to leaders (that is, winners in this
context). It also clearly delineates alliances, as we discuss below.
3.1 Borneo
We consider the first season of Survivor set in Borneo. The abbreviations ID,
OD, C, CON, and B stand for in-degree, out-degree, closeness, CON-score, and
betweenness, respectively.
Name Tribe ID OD C CON B
Richard Tagi 6 10 0.737 42 28.7
Kelly Tagi 0 12 0.682 34 0
Rudy Tagi 8 11 0.778 45 36.483
Susan Tagi 7 10 0.778 44 16.467
Sean Tagi 9 9 0.7 38 17.917
Colleen Pagong 7 8 0.636 29 33.067
Gervaise Pagong 6 7 0.636 31 8.583
Jenna Pagong 11 6 0.583 27 27.85
Greg Pagong 6 5 0.412 15 4.833
Gretchen Pagong 4 4 0.56 17 7.233
Joel Pagong 4 3 0.412 17 1
Dirk Tagi 4 3 0.5 12 1.317
Ramona Pagong 6 2 0.412 10 17.733
Stacey Tagi 6 2 0.452 4 1.733
B.B. Pagong 6 1 0.298 5 0.333
Sonja Tagi 4 1 0.452 4 0.75
Note that Richard, the Sole Survivor of the season, has one of the highest close-
ness and CON scores. Rudy and Susan have higher scores, however. We note that
Kelly won individual immunity several times near the end of the game, and her
voting out Rudy and Susan was a deciding factor in Richard’s win. We also note
that comparing betweenness of players is inconclusive as a predictor of leaders. For
example, we computed Richard’s betweenness as 28.7, Kelly’s as 0, and Rudy’s as
36.5. One explanation of this is that leaders tend to have lower in-degree, which
may reduce the number of paths traversing through them. As such, we do not
include betweenness scores for other seasons.
73.2 China
We next turn to Survivor: China, which was chosen because it represents a sam-
ple after the game was better known, and contestants better understood which
strategies to employ in the game.
Name Tribe ID OD C CON
Todd Fei Long 5 9 0.765 49
Courtney Fei Long 0 9 0.667 39
Amanda Fei Long 0 9 0.737 49
Denise Fei Long 3 9 0.722 40
Peih-Gee Zhan Hu 8 10 0.722 41
Erik Zhan Hu 5 9 0.722 41
James Fei Long 9 6 0.591 31
Frosti Zhan Hu 7 7 0.65 39
Jean-Robert Fei Long 12 4 0.5 23
Jaime Zhan Hu 7 5 0.481 26
Sherea Zhan Hu 6 4 0.448 24
Aaron Fei Long 3 2 0.406 12
Dave Zhan Hu 6 3 0.382 11
Leslie Fei Long 6 1 0.342 9
Ashley Zhan Hu 8 2 0.464 10
Chicken Zhan Hu 5 1 0.333 6
In this season, it is evident that Todd, the Sole Survivor, is the clear front-runner
for Sole Survivor based on his high closeness and CON scores. Courtney and
Amanda emerge also as leaders based on their scores.
83.3 Game Changers
We next analyzed Survivor: Game Changers, as the second-to-last season of the
show.
Name Tribe ID OD C CON
Sarah Nuku 3 13 0.692 64
Brad Nuku 2 12 0.643 49
Troyzan Mana 2 12 0.643 55
Tai Nuku 12 13 0.72 56
Aubry Mana 9 13 0.72 61
Cirie Nuku 0 8 0.613 45
Michaela Mana 11 11 0.643 51
Andrea Nuku 14 8 0.581 39
Sierra Nuku 15 7 0.581 34
Zeke Nuku 11 6 0.6 39
Debbie Nuku 6 7 0.545 32
Ozzy Nuku 7 4 0.5 22
Hali Mana 8 5 0.474 28
Jeff Mana 6 5 0.529 33
Sandra Mana 5 5 0.581 34
JT Nuku 3 2 0.45 18
Malcom Mana 5 3 0.439 24
Caleb Mana 5 3 0.4 21
Tony Mana 7 2 0.439 15
Ciera Mana 9 1 0.4 8
9In this season, the Sole Survivor Sarah has high closeness and CON scores,
but Tai and Aubry have higher closeness scores. Note, however, both players have
high in-degrees which likely disadvantaged them.
3.4 HHH
We now turn to the most recent season of Survivor, Survivor: Heroes vs Healers
vs Hustlers (or HHH, for short). The following table contains network data for
Survivor: HHH.
Name Tribe ID OD C CON
Ben Levu 11 11 0.63 41
Chrissy Levu 7 13 0.68 44
Ryan Yawa 2 14 0.708 47
Devon Yawa 2 11 0.708 55
Mike Soko 9 9 0.63 37
Ashley Levu 8 10 0.607 46
Lauren Yawa 3 7 0.63 39
Joe Soko 12 6 0.607 26
JP Levu 6 8 0.586 25
Cole Soko 7 4 0.531 26
Desi Soko 11 3 0.515 9
Jessica Soko 7 1 0.415 6
Ali Yawa 3 4 0.5 19
Roark Soko 3 1 0.415 6
Alan Levu 2 2 0.415 11
Patrick Yawa 5 2 0.405 6
Simone Yawa 5 1 0.293 4
Katrina Levu 5 1 0.386 5
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The finalists of this season were Ben, Chrissy and Ryan. Ryan and Devon had
the highest overall closeness and highest overall CON scores, followed by Chrissy.
However, Ben, the Sole Survivor, had lower scores than the other finalists; he
secured his place in the final three by playing the hidden immunity idol three
times.
3.5 Big Brother
Given the success of the DCH in Survivor, we turned to data from another social
game Big Brother, focusing on Season 12.
Name ID OD C CON
Hayden 3 16 0.923 44
Lane 3 10 0.857 46
Enzo 4 9 0.8 48
Britney 4 10 0.8 43
Regan 5 8 0.706 49
Brendon 7 9 0.706 40
Matt 9 7 0.632 35
Kathy 7 4 0.6 20
Rachel 8 6 0.667 24
Kristen 7 3 1 25
Andrew 9 2 1 17
Monet 8 1 1 10
Annie 11 0 0 0
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Hayden, the winner of the season, is the clear frontrunner with regards to
closeness and CON scores, with HouseGuests Lane and Enzo rounding out the
top three.
3.6 CON scores
There are 35 seasons in Survivor and 20 for Big Brother. In this section, we
summarize that data. We are interested in knowing if a high CON score correlates
with being the winner. To test this, we check whether the winner of a particular
season has a CON score within the top three or five CON scores out of every player
from that season. As displayed in the table below, 68.6% of winners in Survivor
had a top three CON score, and 94.3% of them have a top five CON score.
We compare the CON score to two other well-known rankings: PageRank and
Jaccard Similarity scores. Jaccard Similarity is a type of normalized CON score,
and both of these methods are commonly used in ranking; see, for example, [11]
and [12]. Note that we computed PageRank scores on the reverse of the network
discussed in Section 2. The table shows that the CON scores are the best pre-
dictor for winners in Survivor, while PageRank is a slightly better predictor in
Big Brother. Furthermore, we calculate the probability of the winner appearing
in a random set of three or five, under the random set column. This probability
varies depending on the size of the network (that is, the number of players). We
see, for example, that the probability of a winner being in a random set of three
in Survivor is between 15% and 18.8%. In all cases, these probabilities are lower
than the CON scores, which suggests that the result of the winner having one of
the largest CON scores is not due to random chance.
12
CON
Page
Rank
Jacard
Similarity
random
set
Survivor Top 3 68.6 54.3 54.3 15.0-18.8
Top 5 94.3 88.6 80.0 25.0-31.3
Big Brother Top 3 60.0 80.0 25.0 17.6-30.0
Top 5 70.0 100 55.0 29.4-50.0
3.7 Alliances
In addition to predicting winners, we analyzed alliances in the various seasons
and computed their edge density. All the alliances conform to the DCH as they
form near independent sets. Some alliances have relatively high edge density, as
we note in the Tagi alliance in Borneo (which includes the sole survivor Richard).
Nevertheless, narrowing down the alliances to subsets of finalists appears to re-
duce the edge density. For example, in the Tagi alliance, the edge density of the
subsets {Kelly,Richard} is 1/2 and {Richard,Rudy} is 0. Analogously, in the Fie-
Long alliance in Survivor: China, the subset {Amanda, Courtney, Todd} has edge
density 0.
Season Winner Finalists Alliances ED
Borneo Richard Kelly
Barbecue: Colleen, Jenna, Gervase 1.667
Tagi : Richard, Rudy, Susan, Kelly 1.5
China Todd
Courtney
Fei Long : Todd, Courtney, Amanda,
Aaron, Denise, James, Frosti
0.667
Amanda Zhan Hu: Peih-Gee, Erik, Jaime 0.0
Game
Changers
Sarah
Brad
Power Six : Sarah, Brad, Troyzan,
Sierra, Debbie, Tai
0.933
Troyzan
Tavua: Aubry, Cirie, Michaela, Ozzy,
Andrea, Zeke, Sarah
1.238
HHH Ben
Chrissy Healers : Joe, Desi, Jessica, Cole, Mike 0.6
Ryan
The Round Table: Chrissy, Ryan, De-
von, JP, Ben, Ashley, Lauren
0.905
Final Four : Ashley, Lauren, Ben, De-
von
1.333
Big Brother 12 Hayden Lane
The Brigade: Enzo, Hayden, Lane,
Matt
0.5
We list the edge densities for each alliance in the Appendix, along with the
edge density for the entire graph. There may be some use in exploring to what
extent alliances have smaller edge density than that of the entire graph. As already
discussed, the edge density of an alliance can become much lower when removing
players who play against their alliance. That being said, 60% of the Survivor
seasons have an alliance with a lower edge density than the edge density for the
total graph, and 95% of Big Brother seasons have an alliance with a lower edge
density than the edge density for the total graph. More exploration is needed to
understand the relationship between the edge densities of alliances and leaders.
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4 Discussion and future work
We introduced the notion of dynamic competition networks and studied their
properties. The Dynamic Competition Hypothesis (DCH) was presented, which
resolves dynamic competition networks arising from social networks into alliances,
detects leaders, and measures the relative strength of alliances. The DCH was
tested with voting data from all seasons of the U.S. television social game shows
Survivor and Big Brother. In all seasons and as predicted by the DCH, alliances
correspond to near independent sets, CON scores accurately determine leaders of
alliances, and leaders are detected via their CON scores and closeness.
In future work, we will mine data from all international seasons of Survivor
and Big Brother (our current analysis uses only seasons from a single country). We
will also look for other data sets to further validate the DCH more broadly, within
the lens of structural balance theory and social network analysis. A weakness of
our current theory is that longer lasting members of a season accumulate more
influence simply due to their survival. In particular, players in Survivor and Big
Brother that survive longer in the game have a greater opportunity to improve
their CON-scores and other metrics. In future work, we will therefore, evaluate
data at earlier stages of the formation of the network. Other areas where we can
explore the DCH are food webs, signed networks (by extracting the subgraph with
negative signs), and geo-political networks. It would be interesting to invert the
DCH to determine low ranked members of dynamic competition networks. Fur-
ther, it would be useful to develop a mathematical model predicting the evolution
of dynamic competition networks, which provably simulates properties predicted
by the DCH.
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